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SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND CULTURAL HISTORY 
ANTHONY ASHBOLT 
Transcript of an interview with Professor Michael Paul Ragin, Robson Professor of 
Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, conducted in the Cafe Grace, 
Berkeley, November 1, 1995. * 
AA: I want, first of all, to take you back to your book on McCarthy and to the 
co-authored book about political change in California. It seems to me 
that both these books have a direct relevance today. For instance, in the 
McCarthy study you argue that far from being a mass phenomenon in 
the populist tradition, McCarthyism was elite manipulated politics. Isn't 
that also true of the new right today? While pretending to be popularly 
based the new right is basically an elite (or ruling class) fraction acting 
in its own interests. So are we seeing history repeat itself? 
MR: No, not really because you are dealing with two quite distinct historical 
moments. There are certain continuities - a lot of people who were 
McCarthyites are very happy about the new right, especially certain 
political intellectuals like Pat Buchanan. If you look at Irving Kristol 
being a kind of apologist for McCarthy and his son William Kristol as 
part of the cultural elite of the new right, you can see the continuities. 
There is a history of demonizing in American politics, yet the forms of 
demonizing linked to McCarthy, on the one hand, and the new right, on 
the other, are very different. The new right arose in the wake of 
significant social and cultural disturbance which did generate 
widespread anxiety - civil rights campaigns, the rise of feminism, youth 
rebellion, grave concern over religion. These sorts of issues weren't on 
the table with McCarthyism. And then, perhaps even more 
fundamentally, there is the economic stagnation in the 1970s 
(sometimes understood as a shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist 
economy) at the expense of the American working and middle classes. 
So there is now an anxiety throughout the American populace which 
simply wasn't the case with McCarthyism. McCarthyism, I argued and 
continue to argue, was an elite phenomenon that had to do with the 
Cold War, with anxiety over Communism. That remained fundamentally 
at the elite level and it really only mattered in wider American politics 
during the Korean War. Many of the analyses of McCarthyism which 
deal with it in terms of generalized cultural anxieties are quite wrong 
because the Fifties was not a period of the politicization of those 
anxieties. 
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It is certainly true that there is an elite component to the new right. 
Take the defense industry. If you look at the Contract On America, it 
includes massive increases in defense spending which are entirely 
delusional at this time. It also includes a business takeover of American 
politics, particularly through deregulation. Look at Newt Gingrich - his 
shift from a moderate to a conservative had to do with this wire 
company which bankrolled him and which didn't want regulations in his 
district. So there are clearly important economic elite interests behind 
the new right. Nevertheless, I don't think it would have its popularity 
without the support of real sections of the American electorate that are 
not elite sections, for example the fundamentalist Christian right and all 
the people who are anxious about race. Those people give a kind of 
popular base to this movement which McCarthyism didn't have. 
AA: So is the new right a populist movement? 
MR: No, because populism was something else entirely. There's always been 
a rhetoric in American politics of populism, broadly understood, because 
that's the only way American politics can work - everyone's calling on 
'the people'. But late nineteenth century Populism was an economic 
movement against the ruling elites and the new right is precisely not 
that. The new right deflects people's economic anxieties onto targets -
affirmative action is blamed, illegal immigrants are blamed but they are 
not the problem. Populism, which focused upon the economic troubles 
of the people, and on the corporations, is the opposite of the new right 
strategies. 
AA: In the final chapter of Political Change in California, there's a very real 
sense in which you predicted what would happen in the 1980s. Orange 
County bigotry, prejudice and fundamentalism are analysed with great 
prescience. And you say quite explicitly that, having thrown up the 
governor of the nation's largest state, it's time to take 'the symbolic 
political universe of southern California seriously' . 
MR: We stopped that book with Reagan's election to the governorship in 
1966, and after that southern California took over American politics. 
That means a couple of things. It means Nixon and then Reagan as 
Presidents. It means the gun belt. It means Hollywood and the 
predominance of symbolic politics and images. It also means the 
particular politics of the Sixties in California - Reagan was elected 
targeting the student movement and the civil rights movement. That 
was the beginning of the counter-revolution that took over American 
politics. It was derailed with Watergate and the loss in Vietnam but 
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came back again with Reagan. We are still living in the counter-
revolution from the Sixties and it's more intense than ever now. 
AA: Let's look at symbolic politics more closely because that's an interesting 
aspect of your work that has been important to you for some time. 
There's the symbolic world of southern California revolving around, in 
part, privatized suburbia and a somewhat idealized family. Much later in 
your study of Reagan almost everything becomes symbolic -
Baudrillard's simulacrum has triumphed, except you still believe there is 
a difference between image and reality. Isn't there a sense in which 
symbolic politics and image politics have taken over, first in California 
and then America as a whole, during the last twenty or thirty years? 
MR: Image, yes but it is important to see what the central images are - family 
and race. First, the family - it's vital to see the central importance of the 
institution of the family which came under attack in the Sixties from the 
youth revolt before it came under attack from feminism. The whole race 
question was understood to be a threat to the family - fears of 
intermarriage and so on. So, even though the term wasn't used at the 
time, 'traditional family values' became a rallying cry of a whole set of 
forces opposed to what was going on in the Sixties. The kinds of issues 
which arise in the family - intimate, personal issues, issues of ways of 
life and personal relations - became political. The family became a locus 
of politics and that takes you into the terrain of symbolic politics. This 
began to happen in the Sixties when we were coming off from the New 
Deal period in which American politics was organized around socio-
economic interests. This was, it turned out (in my opinion), atypical. I 
grew up with it, I assumed that's the way it always was, I started doing 
a type of interest group or class analysis originally and so on. But by the 
middle of the Sixties it became clear that we had a war in Vietnam 
which was inexplicable in terms of economic interests, except for the 
interests of the military industrial complex. You were really seeing anti-
Communism as ideology plus an obsession with American weakness in 
symbolic more than material terms. You also had the race question 
which had been buried by the New Deal. Once you begin to look at 
American history, you find that American politics has been myth-
dominated. So when I began this work on symbolic politics, I was 
actually re-connecting to the history of the United States, recognizing 
that the New Deal is the great exception. And we saw the end of the 
New Deal order probably with the election of 1968. 
AA: You're talking in part about the idea of America, the ideal America that 
never really existed in the way it was propagated. Yet how is the New 
Deal a great exception? 
--
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MR: The New Deal is a class based phenomenon. For the first time in 
America you have a welfare state, you have mass organization of trade 
unions, you have wage and hour laws, you have public works, you have 
something which looks a little more like the ways western industrial 
democracies operate, particularly in terms of class politics and the 
welfare state. It's quite an exception. Historically, America is founded 
upon some vision of what you call an ideal America which people now 
are beginning to talk about as whiteness. Whiteness as this elevated, 
abstract, disembodied thing which is defining itself in relation to the 
major factors which have formed the United States historically and 
mythologically, namely the dispossession of Indians and the enslave-
ment of blacks. This process forms the basis of our major national myths 
and forms of culture, the frontier myth and blackface minstrelsy, which 
have dominated American culture and politics from the beginning. 
These myths were in abeyance in a certain kind of way during the New 
Deal but they have come back powerfully now. 
AA: These myths involve a forgetting of history, a reinvention of history, so 
was there anything during the New Deal which 'remembered'? 
MR: There was a lot of New Deal attention to the 'real' America which had to 
do with ordinary people and their problems - in profound ways, like 
Agee's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, or in superficial ways like the book 
and the movie Grapes of Wrath. There was a kind of populist moment to 
the New Deal which wanted to think of itself as rooted in an American 
past (take Woody Guthrie, WPA art) there was a celebration of a certain 
sort of American history which included quite a deal of sympathy for the 
Indians (look at the work of The Bureau ofIndian Affairs). There was a 
lot of effort to get in touch with rather decent things in ordinary 
American life. Yet despite this, Roosevelt effectively buried the question 
of race. He wouldn't support an anti-lynching bill. Under white 
supremacist southern pressure he exempted agricultural and domestic 
workers from Social Security. There was a kind of burying of the issue of 
race in black-white and Indian-white relations and that was the 
condition for a shift from race to class. In the Sixties those things were 
remembered through the civil rights movement and because of the 
Vietnam war which led people to rethink the history of the United 
States as an imperial history. Once those things were remembered, it 
wasn't necessarily good for American politics because the counter-
revolution was stronger than the revolution. There was too much 
unwillingness to repudiate that whole history and so there became a 
kind of nationalist identification with it, with white supremacy and 
American expansion. So you have the phenomenon now where ninety 
nine senators vote against the new standards for American history in 
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high school (standards set by a panel of perfectly reasonable, respectable 
historians) because what the panel thought high school students ought 
to know involved a demythologizing of the American past. 
AA: I want to talk a bit more about the symbolic politics of the family 
because it's become increasingly interesting in terms of American 
historiography and to some degree political science. The symbolic 
politics of the family was crucial to the right, old and new, yet the family 
has also found favor amongst leftist or left-liberal critics - Christopher 
Lasch, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Michael Lerner, Jackson Lears. Arguably, 
they speak good sense about the family (as against the bad sense of the 
new right) but, given that you are highly critical of pro-family rhetoric, 
what's your position? 
MR: I think the invocation of the family in politics tends to be reactionary 
and mystifying. The reason for that is that the invocation is nostalgic 
and it's patriarchal. I think that's precisely when you start worrying 
about values and people having the right values - and you're also 
worrying about authority - you're forgetting crucial problems, 
particularly concerning political economy. 
The Moynihan report on the Negro family is a classic example of this. 
Right in the middle of the civil rights movement, you have massive 
unemployment in the ghetto, you have severe racial segregation, so you 
might think that you want to focus on those matters of political 
economy if you want to do something about the ghetto. Instead 
Moynihan focuses on the Negro family and the problem with that family 
is seen to be matriarchy. Young black men, the report argues, need a 
patriarchal structure and that's the army. Moynihan himself is one of 
eleven Democratic senators to continue to support welfare as an 
entitlement for the children of unwed mothers. A whole part of the New 
Deal order is being repealed as we speak and Moynihan is one of those 
people against that repeal. He still thinks that if children are born out of 
wedlock they are entitled to be taken care of in some way. But his 
discourse is importantly responsible for why they are not being taken 
care of right now and that is because the problem of the inner-city is 
seen to be a family failure instead of a problem of political economy. So, 
usually the invocation of the family has to do with an anxiety about 
fathers not being in control (as with Moynihan). And that anxiety rarely 
has good political consequences. I make an analysis of the psychological 
and symbolic core of politics in order to try and shift the discourse in the 
direction of political economy. 
AA: But there is a political economy of family life. 
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MR: Sure there is. There's a problem with the feminization of poverty - that's 
the problem we should be talking about, not family values. 
AA: While in the world of the family, it seems appropriate to ask a question 
about fathers in general and your father in particular. The theme of 
fathers and sons recurs in your work since the early 1970s. Your book 
on Jackson was entitled Fathers and Children and you think it important in 
Freudian terms that jackson's father died before Andrew was born. 
Later, you stress the fact that Ronald Reagan needed to be free of his 
father and in tum was not a real father himself. Filmmaker D.W. Griffith 
couldn't be free of his father to the point where he died of drink (just as 
his father had) and he thus 'entered his father's dead body'. The book on 
Melville was dedicated to your father, a textile workers' organizer 
(Melville'S father was a cloth importer). The links or lack of links 
between fathers and sons seem to be highly significant in your work. 
What do you make of this observation of mine in both personal and 
political terms? 
MR: My father was a textile workers' organizer, a labour leader and I was very 
much under his influence. My father, because his union failed, remained 
a lot more radical than many of his friends whose unions hadn't yet 
failed (the auto workers, steelworkers, and so on). The new left in its 
early years was basically a movement of people like me (although I was a 
little older than that generation), people whose fathers were liberal and 
there was a rebellion against a kind of liberal politics that didn't seem to 
be engaged in a radical way any more. So I think there is a perfectly 
legitimate student revolt which is also a family revolt and we did in the 
Sixties begin to focus upon generational questions. That partly explains 
my shift away from a social democratic way of interpreting things to a 
more symbolic cultural way of interpreting things - that was, to some 
degree, a generational rebellion. Yet I remained very close to my father. 
He wasn't crazy about the Jackson book because it was too 
psychoanalytic for him (and maybe because of the theme of patriarchal 
oppression) but he loved having my Melville book dedicated to him. He 
also became radicalized himself again in the Sixties. A lot of old left 
people became neoconservatives then but my father did not, so I was 
lucky in that respect. He remained connected to me and my work and we 
shared this world. That's the personal part. I became fascinated, partly 
for personal reasons, by the efforts of important American political and 
cultural figures to establish their own identity against some kind of 
either failed or too powerful paternal presence. So I began to analyze 
American politics that way, with Jackson, with Melville, with Griffith 
and with Reagan. 
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AA.: What about Clinton? 
MR: Well you could do something like that with Clinton but Clinton to me is 
a rather pathetic and not very interesting figure who is responsible for a 
lot of the politics under which we're now living by his own un-
willingness to be confrontational. Everyone says 'he's the son of an 
alcoholic' and he shares that with Reagan. But Reagan had a very clear 
delusional political vision which he managed to impose on the country, 
while Clinton has none and thus creates the space for all the energy to 
come from the right, even if that ends up benefiting him politically as 
the moderate voice against the demons he's helped unleash. I guess I'm 
disgusted with Clinton but also not very interested in him. I have tended 
to try to work on people who had a powerful impact, either political or 
literary, in their own right which is certainly true of Jackson in relation 
to Indian removal, certainly true of Melville the great American novelist, 
and certainly of Griffith who made the most important early films. I'm 
criticized by some people for focusing upon great historic moments, 
transformative moments and the people who made them. If you don't 
come of age in a transformative period, say if you come of age in the 
Seventies or Eighties, you might want to feel there's a lot more room for 
maneuver and you don't have to focus on the great heroic failures. But 
my generation did come of age during a transformative period, so that's 
what I do. 
AA.: There's something almost refreshingly 'politically incorrect' about the 
Freudian analysis in the Jackson book. I gather a new introduction 
almost apologizes for this patriarchal discourse. 
MR: No, not really. What I say in that new introduction is that I published 
my book in almost exactly the same year as Dorothy Dinnerstein 
published The Mermaid and the Minotaur and Nancy Chodorow published 
The Reproduction of Mothering. I was interested not only in the topic of 
fathers and sons but also in the anxieties that are recreated later in life 
but originally come from early childhood relations with the mother and 
a kind of misogyny that comes out of a fear of dependence on women. 
That was a big part of my Jackson book, even though it also tended to 
reflect a psychoanalytic orthodoxy which was being undermined. There 
was a psychoanalytic discourse taking hold which is really about the 
early mother, male anxieties in relation to women and I think of myself 
in that tradition which goes back to Melanie Klein more than Freud. I 
see myself as a critic of Freudian patriarchalism because Freud was 
interested in resurrecting the patriarchal father and I'm interested in 
criticizing that from what I'd like to think of as a more feminist position. 
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supporter of feminism. I think my later work is much less dogmatically 
or mechanically Freudian and Kleinian than the Jackson book, but I've 
hardly abandoned a psychoanalytic orientation. The Jackson book has 
many virtues but its unreconstructed psychological liberationism is a 
product of the late 1960s and early 1970s, what Lenin would call the 
'infantile disorder' of the times. 
AA: But at the very least you seem to be saying that a world without fathers 
is no utopia. 
MR: I see, that's interesting. Some people have said that in taking the 
position that there's a problem in male dependence upon the early 
mother, I must believe that the solution to that problem ought to be 
strong fathers, so I sound exactly like Daniel Patrick Moynihan. I don't 
want to sound like him but there are some things in the Jackson book 
which have been interpreted that way. I'm very critical of the position 
that patriarchal claims - in slavery, in Indian relations, in traditional 
family values - invoke a flawed, punitive father to get the fantasized all-
powerful mother under control. Patriarchal ideology is a defence against 
anxieties about women that should be dealt with in a different way, 
namely by creating sexual equality. Let's not, however, equate sexual 
equality with getting rid of fathers. 
AA: Some socialist feminist historians have rejected the term patriarchy as 
being too fixed, immutable, ahistorical. You still use the term. 
MR: You have to specify what you mean. Within American culture there has 
been a recurrent anxiety about the weakness of paternal authority and 
there have been constant efforts to cement its role. You can see this in 
Indian relations, slave relations, family relations. There are, of course, 
changes over time and within different arenas, and they have to be 
specified. 
AA: You have been one of the more important supporters of the American 
exceptionalism thesis. I'm thinking particularly about your stress on 
American liberalism (a very American liberalism), the centrality of race 
over class for most of American history. Yours isn't a celebratory variety 
of American exceptionalism (unlike Daniel Boorstin), nonetheless all 
such exceptionalist doctrines have come in for a battering in recent 
times. What would you say about the American exceptionalism thesis 
now? 
MR: My intellectual father was Louis Hartz. I am just about the only radical 
who counts Louis Hartz as an important authority. If you understand 
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Hartz's development you will be able to understand my position. Hanz 
started as a Marxist but when he abandoned that position he retained 
one crucial feature of it which was the notion that America, as he put it 
later, was a fragment society coming out of the liberal fragment. So the 
absence of a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy and the absence of 
socialism, the sweep of a certain kind of propertied liberal individualism 
was peculiar to the United States among western industrial societies, 
and among other fragments which spun out of Europe in the period of 
settlement. Another word for fragment societies is settler societies. 
Hartz began to think about settler societies and as the Sixties started he 
began to think about race. That's exactly the same evolution that I went 
through. I started out with a focus upon the peculiar sway of a 
propertied liberal individualism in the United States. Then I began to 
realize that this intersects with race, and it intersects with race because 
the United States was a settler society, formed at the origins of the 
capitalist world system - formed out of the triangular trade, out of the 
meeting point of Africa, the New World and Europe. 
There are differences with other settler societies and differences with 
Europe. What is distinctive about the United States is that it was a 
bourgeois society built upon Indian land, with slave labour, which then 
takes this history and turns it into myth. That is to say it makes the 
dispossession of Indians and the process of that dispossession one of its 
central myths - the frontier myth, Daniel Boone, Leatherstocking, the 
western movie (everybody knows that's been America's contribution to 
world culture). Then there was slavery, and blackface minstrelsy, which 
was associated with Jacksonian democracy, was the first and most 
popular form of mass culture in the world - miming the expropriation of 
blacks by putting on blackface and black voice. So the other major myth 
has to do with white and black and I argue in my new book that white 
over black in the form of black over white dominates the crucial 
moments in American motion picture history - Uncle Tom's Cabin, Birth of 
a Nation, The Jazz Singer (the first talking picture which is also the 
immigrant blackface Americanization story), and then Gone With the 
Wind (the first blockbuster movie). In other words, making culture out 
of the subjugation of peoples of colour is what is distinctive about 
American culture and it's also what characterizes American politics. I 




AA: One thing you have written about extensively which brings American I, 
exceptional ism to the surface is the year 1848. Within America you have I' 
racial domination, murder, exploitation, the thrust towards the frontier, 11 
manifest destiny, imperialism. Is it possible that this American 1848 was .11'. 
more significant than the European 1848? " , 
; I 
~ .. 
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MR: I think that's true because the European 1848 was a failure. Of course, if 
you follow Lukacs then there were very important consequences 
including the creation of cultural modernism and of mass working class 
parties in the latter part of the century but it is still the case that the 
1848 liberal nationalist revolutions failed. Whereas the American 1848 
succeeded. What I argue is that exactly parallel to the 1848 revolutions 
in Europe is the liberal expansionist moment in America (involving 
racial expansionism rather than a struggle against aristocracy, although 
Tocqueville does call the Indians the lords of the forest). The American 
1848, the Mexican War, does founder on the conflict over slavery 
between the slave states and the free states just as the European 1848 
foundered due to class conflict. But out of the American 1848 you get a 
civil war - this is really the engine of American history in the mid 19th 
century in a way that the consequences of 1848 are not in Europe. My 
main point is that in America it's expansion and it's race (Indians and 
blacks), in Europe it's much more about class. 
AA: It seems like a bit of a jump from 1848 to 1968, but ... 
MR: It's the same thing, exactly the same. '68 is an international pheno-
menon like 1848, another failed utopian moment, but in the United 
States it's again tied up with these two fundamental issues - race (civil 
rights, black power, the urban uprising) and expansionism (the war in 
Vietnam, which was an extension of the conquest of Indians. Vietnam 
was 'Indian country'). So the specificity of ' 68 in America was, once 
again, Indians and blacks. 
AA: Here in Berkeley, by 1968 the radicals dreamed of revolution (even if 
just in one town or one street. Berkeley was seen as an island of 
socialism, there was a Telegraph Avenue Liberation Front). The dreams 
came unstuck soon after People's Park but I sense you don't think, as so 
many now do, that the left was wrong to dream. And you've been in 
Berkeley since 1963 and Berkeley has always been seen as different from 
America, itself exceptional. Perhaps you would like to reflect upon that 
because it again brings up personal and political dimensions. 
MR: What's different about Berkeley? The Free Speech Movement was pro-
duced by people who come back from Mississippi Freedom Summer (so 
there's the race or civil rights connection) and it culminated in People's 
Park which was explicitly understood as a protest against the taking of 
communal land (in a way which may seem a little quaint today but at 
the time seemed in the tradition of the Indians). Personally, if I'd stayed 
in the east I would have been much more under the sway of the 
established eastern institutions and intellectuals, and the Cold War 
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discourse which never penetrated northern California to the same 
degree. So there was more freedom here which enabled things to happen 
and I identified closely with what was happening. I was very influenced 
by students I worked with in that period (one of whom was leading 
Berkeley radical Frank Bardacke), and also by a group of political 
theorists here (Sheldon Wolin, John Schaar and Norman Jacobson) who 
were emancipated from Cold War ways of thinking. So it was a 
tremendous liberation to get out of Harvard and Chicago (although 
Chicago was very stimulating) and to be here as the student movement 
took off. I went from a quiescent and stultifying Harvard in the Fifties, 
to a more intellectually and also politically exciting Chicago in the late 
Fifties and early Sixties but it was really a break to come to Berkeley. 
AA: Finally, as Clinton'S 'liberalism' succumbs to new right ideology, as the 
welfare state is eroded on a daily basis, as locally the Regents of the 
University of California have abolished affirmative action and there's 
been talk of big rises in fees, as Eugene Genovese has become Dinesh 
D'Souza's ad man, is there anything left to dream about? 
MR: The Genovese thing is very interesting because he is so authoritarian. He 
used to be a Stalinist defender of the slave ruling class and now he's an 
anti-Stalinist defender of the slave ruling class. He is an important 
scholar and a lot of his work is very impressive. But the core driving 
motivation of Genovese is patriarchal authoritarianism. Genovese is one 
of a number of people - some are more strident, some are more liberal -
who, because they can't let go of this idea of an authoritarian centre 
which is made up of white men, are extremely anxious about women 
and people of color speaking for themselves and think that if only they 
stopped speaking for themselves we could have ... well, the dream varies 
... the good family, the welfare state, class politics, and so on. The 
position which wishes that the fractures in a white male-dominated 
coalition would go away, that white men would once again be the 
universal class, is very reactionary. 
So, what to dream of now? Some people think that we should dream of 
the new immigration plus feminism because the patriarchal centre can't 
withstand the pressure from those social forces. Out of this ferment, it is 
hoped, something could come, comparable historically to the labor and 
civil rights movements. At the moment we have a severe black-white 
divide and these people want to transcend that by embracing something 
more 'multicultural'. But the problem, as I argue in my latest book, is 
that it is precisely at times of mass immigration that you get an 
increasing focus on black and white, a racializing of politics (the 
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remove race as a category) in order to incorporate the immigrants into 
the dominant society, which is done by using blackface as a transitional 
mode toward becoming white. So, historically, the immigrants enter the 
American racial divide, they play with it and they cross over to the white 
side. There' 5 this diabolical link between mass immigration which ought 
to pluralize America and a racial divide which binarizes it and I think 
we're having that reproduced again. The black-white divide is becoming 
fundamental as a way of moving some new immigrants onto the white 
side, demonizing others as inferior (racially inferior or culturally 
inferior). Somehow we have to break out of it but I don't have a 
program. I do think we need to go back to class politics or, if you want 
to do it in less Marxist terms, to a public opposed to the plutocrats who 
are capitalizing on the racial divide. Privatization, in which economic 
and familial meanings are linked, is the thing to oppose. But at the same 
time it does seem to me that you aren't going to have a class or public 
politics as long as people are so obsessed with the danger of those dark 
peoples, and those women, and those queers. As long as you have that 
kind of fear it's always going to be mobilized against some kind of class 
alliance. Race and sex are the trump card in this country until somehow 
they are dealt with. You can't just wish that they would go away. 
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